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I. INTRODUCTION
WHAT DO WE WORRY ABOUT WHEN WE WORRY ABOUT GOOGLE? Will the company
combine the worst aspects of Microsoft, ChoicePoint, WalMart, Experian, and
News Corporation?' Or will its "Don't Be Evil" slogan and unique ownership struc-
ture assure some accountability to the public?2
Some of the most creative minds in cyberlaw, science fiction, and cultural studies
have addressed those questions.3 Some have envisioned Google-driven dystopiasi
In Cory Doctorow's story Scroogled, the Department of Homeland Security out-
sources so much surveillance to Google that the company becomes a new J. Edgar
. Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School. I wish to thank James Grimmelmann for his
comments on a draft of this Essay. I certainly have not been able to respond to all of his comments, but thank
him for the kind of open-minded conversation that right-of-reply at its best facilitates.
1. Google has a uniquely dominant place in the universe of search engines and for that reason will be the
primary focus of this Essay. It is aiming to combine social networking, software, database, media, and retail
capabilities in an unprecedented way. At the time of this writing (November 2007), its market capitalization
made it the fifth largest company in the United States, and few companies are unafraid of its potential to
restructure their markets. Steve Lohr, The Risks to Google's Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, at Cl. ("In Septem-
ber, Google's share of Web searches in the United States was 67 percent, up from 54 percent a year earlier,
reports Compete.com, a Web analytics firm. The Yahoo share was 19 percent, compared with 29 percent a year
earlier. And Microsoft had 9 percent, up slightly from a year ago."); see also Complaint at 5 30, In re Google,
Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc., Federal Trade Commission (Apr. 20, 2007) (listing the range of services Google
provides), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/epic.complaint.pdf, Steve Lohr, Just Googling It
Is Striking Fear into Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, § 1, at 1 (focusing on WalMart's worries).
2. Google Investor Relations, Google Code of Conduct, http://investor.google.com/conduct.html (last
visited Sept. 27, 2007).
3. See Who's afraid of Google?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2007, at 9 (outlining the fears different economic
and political groups have over Google's growth and increasing collection of private information).
4. Cory Doctorow, Scroogled, RADAR, Sept. 12, 2007, http://www.radaronline.com/from-the-magazine/
2007/09/google-fictionevil-dangerous-surveillance_control_l.php; see also WALTER KIRN, THE UNBINOING
(2007). Though some may dismiss such sources as middlebrow or speculative, legal theorist James Boyle coun-
ters with the observation that, "Sadly for academics, the best social theorists of the information age are still
science fiction writers and, in particular cyberpunks-the originators of the phrase 'cyberspace' and the pre-
mier fantasists of the Net. If one wants to understand the information age, this is a good place to start." James
Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 88 (1997). The Stanford
Center for Internet and Society and the journal of Law & Contemporary Problems feted the tenth anniversary
of this essay with a conference and journal edition featuring leading intellectual property scholars and com-
mons theorists. See Cultural Environmentalism @ 10, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 1; see also James
Boyle, Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 5.
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Hoover, wielding extraordinary power over its ostensible political masters.' Walter
Kirn imagines an omniscient data source that becomes a trusted oracle of advice
for the masses.6 The creators of the short film EPIC 2014 imagine a Google capable
of bringing the print media to heel in less than a decade, as consumers demand an
"Evolving Personalized Information Construct" (EPIC) that rapidly displaces the
news as we know it.7
My work on the negative externalities generated by dominant search engines' has
focused on a more mundane, but immediate problem: the possibility that high-
ranking results about a certain searched term are harmful from either a societal
perspective," or from the perspective of an entity with a stake in the search term.'"
For example, if all the results about a (hypothetical) person named Xavier Hol-
lidayly are negative opinions or mistaken accusations, should he get any chance to
reply to them on the search page on which they appear-or at least to indicate with
an asterisk a link that leads to a page that will do so? Or if the owner of the (again
fictitious) trademark Flanakapan Popsicles finds that all the results in response to
that term lead to competitors' websites, should she be able to indicate on that page
that she owns the mark FLANAKAPAN?"
In a 2006 article, I proposed that individuals like Hollidayly or mark owners like
Flanakapan' 2 should, in some circumstances, have the right to place an asterisk
linking to a reply on the first page of objectionable search results generated by their
5. Doctorow, supra note 4.
6. KIRN, supra note 4, at 4.
7. EPIC 2014 (Robin Sloan & Matt Thompson 2004), available at http://robinsloan.com/epic/. See gener-
ally Matt Thompson, EPIC 2014: The Future is Now, POYNTERONLINE, July 21, 2005, http://www.poynter.org/
content/contentview.asp?id=8563 1.
8. We provisionally can consider a dominant search engine one with over 30 percent market share.
Google clearly satisfies this criteria in the United States and much of Europe, but would not satisfy this criteria
in South Korea, where Naver dominates. See Choe Sang-Hun, South Koreans Connect through Search Engine,
N.Y. TiMES, July 5, 2007, at C9.
9. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness and Accountability in the
Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 24-30, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1002453). For a good typology of the types of bias that search engines may
introduce, see Jennifer A. Chandler, A Right To Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the
Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1109 (2007) ("[FJorms of bias introduced by search engines[ I includ[e] (1)
the removal of websites from the search engine index, (2) the reduction of website ranking, (3) the refusal to
accept keyword-triggered advertisements from certain websites, and (4) the practice of providing preferences in
indexing or ranking for paying websites." ).
10. Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 115, 135-36 (2006).
11. 1 generated both of these unlikely names by googling them and assuring that there were no results for
them. One can easily imagine a day when a court accepts as evidence of a mark's fancifulness its creator's
assurance that it was "unGoogleable"-i.e., no other evidence of the mark appears on the web. See, e.g., Ann
Harrison, 'UnGoogleables' Hide from Search, WIRED, Oct. 3, 2005, http://www.wired.compolitics/security
news/2005/10/68998 (describing the phenomena of being unGoogleable). Even the decision to use google as a
verb is a way of undermining Google, Inc.'s power, given its effort to prevent "Google" from becoming generic.
Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1789
(2007); Ben Moshinsky, Google Ready to Fight Genericization, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Dec. 2005, at 14.
12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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name or mark. 3 Critics have claimed that the proposal would either be unworkable
or a troubling instance of "forced speech" 4 or "censored search."'" In this Essay, I
respond to their criticisms and try to refine the proposal. 6 Our conversation
should prove illuminating on issues of search engine accountability, although our
differences ultimately may not be amenable to reason."
II. CENSORED SEARCH?
James Grimmelmann has written one of the most comprehensive commentaries on
search engine law.'8 In a recent essay addressing the AutoAdmit controversy, Grim-
melmann addresses a variety of proposals designed to ameliorate search engines'
role in increasing the salience of damaging and inaccurate information online. 9 He
begins with my asterisk proposal:
First, and least intrusively, Frank Pasquale has proposed a kind of right of reply
at the level of search results. If a high-ranking result in a search on Bob's name
is [a] calumny, Pasquale would give Bob the right to make the search engine
place an asterisk on its results page. The asterisk would hyperlink to a Web
page where Bob sets the story straight.2°
Grimmelmann finds the proposal deficient for several reasons, each of which is
worth responding to in some detail.
Grimmelmann first contends that the asterisk requirement would "hinder users'
ability to choose among diverse search engines," because it "might inhibit the devel-
opment of better, more helpful responses-such as personalized search based on
the recommendations of one's friends, or semantic analyses that can automatically
put Web pages in a broader context."'" Grimmelmann's perceptive earlier article,
13. Pasquale, supra note 10, at 135-36.
14. For a compelling argument against this being considered unconstitutionally compelled speech, see
Jennifer Chandler's discussion of Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 27
(2006). Chandler, supra note 9, at 1129; see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Don't Censor Search, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 48, 51 (2007); Tech-
nology & Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/08/pasquale-bracha.htm (Aug. 8,
2007, 10:11 EST).
16. See infra Parts II, III.
17. See, e.g., David G. Post, What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1439, 1442-48 (2000) (suggesting that libertarians will have a difficult time finding common ground with
Lawrence Lessig's regulatory proposals due to a fundamental divergence in values). Many current debates in
cyberlaw are not amenable to empirical research and instead hinge on rival visions of the ideal development of
online space. Moreover, even finding agreement on objective facts may be difficult-there is an inextricable
intertwining of description and judgment (or, as lawyers often experience, fact and law) in the characterization
of rights and responsibilities online.
18. See James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IowA L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
19. Grimmelmann, supra note 15, at 49.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 50.
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Regulation by Software, commends respect for his opinions about the interrelation-
ship between regulation and the development of search technology. 2 However, is
there real danger here that a regulatory first step toward accountability would im-
pede technological development? Might the relationship actually be the reverse-
that a limited right-of-reply mandate actually could lead to more investment in
resources that would head off future mandates? For example, the Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP) was developed in response to the possibility that certain
domain name disputes could lead to unduly extensive civil litigation. 3 Informal
forums can catalyze self-regulation by creating incentives for search engines to
defuse the concerns that could lead to more heavy-handed responses.24 A blanket
immunity for search engines would remove the key incentive they now have for
better behavior.2 They would no longer "bargain in the shadow of" more compre-
hensive responses."
Admittedly, there is long-standing literature critiquing "command and control"
style regulation that forced businesses to meet certain ends by adapting certain
technology. 7 However, results-oriented regulation in the environmental context
has been credited with creating incentives for corporations to develop better meth-
ods of controlling pollution. For example, acid rain declined markedly when
companies were forced to start paying for pollution permits for sulphur dioxide.29
22. See James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719 (2005).
23. Orion Armon, Is This as Good as It Gets? An Appraisal of ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP) Three Years after Implementation, 22 REV. LITIG. 99, 104-09 (2003).
24. For a parallel take on network neutrality regulation, see Edward W. Felten, Nuts and Bolts of Network
Neutrality (Center for Info. Tech. Policy, Princeton University, July 6, 2006), available at http://
itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf ("The present situation, with the network neutrality issue on the ta-
ble in Washington but no rules yet adopted, is in many ways ideal. ISPs, knowing that discriminating now
would make regulation seem more necessary, are on their best behavior; and with no rules yet adopted we
don't have to face the difficult issues of line-drawing and enforcement. Enacting strong regulation now would
risk side-effects, and passing toothless regulation now would remove the threat of regulation. If it is possible to
maintain the threat of regulation while leaving the issue unresolved, time will teach us more about what
regulation, if any, is needed."). The kinds of blanket First Amendment immunities discussed later in this piece
could upset this equilibrium.
25. See Craig W. Walker, Application of the DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions to Search Engines, 9 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 22 (2004).
26. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
27. E.g., THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 4 (Marian R.
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); see also Allen Blackman & Winston Harrington, The Use of Economic
Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution, 9 J. ENV'T
& DEv. 5, 11-13 (2000).
28. Sam Napolitano et al., The U.S. Acid Rain Program: Key Insights from the Design, Operation, and Assess-
ment of a Cap-and-Trade Program, ELEC. J., Aug./Sept. 2007, at 57, available at http://www.epa.gov/
AIRMARKET/resource/docs/US%2OAcid%2ORain%2OProgram-Elec%20journa%2OAug%202007.pdf.
29. Id. at 47-49.
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The key here is to develop responsive, flexible regulation,3" rather than rigid man-
dates that would actually crowd out or impede innovation.3'
In the context of trademark- or privacy-undermining search results, what would
such a regulation look like? The asterisk proposal might be configured as a back-
stop that would only be implemented after a complainant exhausted administrative
processes that permitted a search engine (or trusted third party) to investigate the
matter.32 Consider the self-regulation success story of eBay. This "perfect store" has
developed sophisticated methods of reputation management in order to manage
disputes among its users. 3 Though no precise regulation forced eBay to better
manage disputes, the company wisely decided to defuse the threat of being dragged
into multiple litigations by developing internal methods of resolving disputes. 4
Of course, online marketplaces are immunized by statutory safe harbors in many
cases, so we may have to look beyond cyberspace to find internal administrative
procedures more clearly influenced by threats of regulatory or legal intervention.35
In the healthcare context, private insurance companies make millions of decisions
each year that are inflected by a threat of eventual litigation if their responses to
customer concerns prove unsatisfactory.36 By and large, judges are unwilling to
intervene if they can be convinced that the private company tried its best to act in a
fair and reasonable matter internally.37 But it is difficult to imagine those types of
internal processes being developed in the absence of any threat of judicial or ad-
ministrative action.
Would the eventual imposition of an asterisk inevitably amount to an undue
burden on a search engine? If there is one thing that cyberlaw scholarship has
taught in the past few years, it is the importance of diversifying settings for dispute
30. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 3-7 (1992); Napolitano et al., supra note
28, at 57-58.
31. Blackman & Harrington, supra note 27, at 12-13.
32. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
33. ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE: INSIDE EBAY 27 (2002); Lenden Webb, Brainstorming Meets Online
Dispute Resolution, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 337, 339 (2004); Lenden Webb, International BBB Ratings a la eBay:
A Proposal for an Improved Online Better Business Bureau to Facilitate International Business Transactions, 35
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 127, 128 (2004); Mary M. Calkins, Comment, My Reputation Always Had More Fun Than
Me: The Failure of eBay's Feedback Model to Effectively Prevent Online Auction Fraud, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 33, 36
(2001).
34. Calkins, supra note 33, at 36. Admittedly, section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides an
immunity from intermediary liability for sites like eBay. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting
Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335 (2005) (criticizing the expansive reach of this safe harbor).
35. eBay has qualified for Digital Millennium Copyright Act safe harbors immunizing it from liability for
the activities of sellers. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1093-96 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
36. See, e.g., Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11
(1999) (describing a case study where medical insurance companies began covering a bone-marrow procedure
specifically because of the growing fear of litigation over non-coverage).
37. Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d 703, 704 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965)) (noting that courts may not intervene in employment cases until an employee has
exhausted their rights under the company's internal grievance procedures).
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resolution." Both Michael Carroll and Mark Lemley & Anthony Reese have devel-
oped proposals for such fora in the contexts of fair use determinations and online
file sharing (respectively)." Lemley also has proposed a uniform "safe harbor" for
online intermediaries that would feature fast and efficient resolution of disputes.40
But we need not turn to legal academics' proposals: the UDRP has handled
thousands of disputes over domain names since its inception, helping to divert a
flood of trademark cases away from courts and into more efficient (if less due
process-oriented) arbitral settings. " l
Admittedly, some of the disagreement between Grimmelmann and I may come
down to different models of the innovation process. Perhaps Grimmelmann be-
lieves that money spent trying to comply with a government-imposed asterisk re-
quirement would be better spent on such innovations as "personalized search" or
"semantic analyses that can automatically put web pages in a broader context."42
Unfortunately, the current search market does not provide much incentive for
pushing research in that direction until search engines themselves start to feel the
adverse consequences of results that are now primarily affecting isolated examples
or entities.
For example, imagine a job applicant involved in a nasty breakup finds that a
web page from DontDateHimGirl.com is the top result attached to his name.4"
Potential employers who google him to find out what has been written about him
on the web are going to see that site at the top of the list." Now imagine one search
engine decides to respond to complaints from applicants like him (by granting an
asterisk linking his reply and clarification), while another one refuses to respond.
The applicant may well decide to use the responsive search engine out of loyalty,
but it is by no means clear that others who want to investigate the applicant will do
so. In fact, given the current media environment, it would not be surprising if the
most salacious, dirt-digging engine managed to attain the highest market share. As
Grimmelmann himself noted in his Structure of Search Engine Law, a search engine
38. E.g., Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement without Restricting
Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1351-52 (2004).
39. See generally Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007); Mark A. Lemley & R.
Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for Resolving Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005).
40. Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors 2 (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper, No. 979836,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=979836.
41. INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
UNDER UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (May 10, 2004), http://www.icann.org/udrp/
proceedings-stat.htm.
42. Grimmelmann, supra note 15, at 50.
43. See Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 32 n.164.
44. Although similar conduct is common in everyday hiring practices in the United States, see, e.g., Robert
Sprague, Googling Job Applicants: Incorporating Personal Information into Hiring Decisions, 23 LAB. LAW. 19
(2007), Finnish law actually bars employers from conducting internet searches on employees without their
consent. Act on the Protection of Privacy in Working Life, 759/2004 (2004) (Fin.).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
FRANK PASQUALE
is an agent for many principals." If the profits made from prying principals are
greater than those garnered from the loyalty of protected principals, where is the
incentive for the search engines to be concerned with desires of the former group?
The same dynamics can occur in the context of trademark law-leading many
brand owners to fear that Google will amount to a new WalMart.46 If the organic
search results in response to a trademark feature all the trademark owner's compet-
itors, the mark owner may well try to pay Google for a high ranking in its paid
results. But there is no guarantee that it will be able to purchase salient advertising,
and even if it does, the potential for consumer confusion is high. 7
Finally, the right of reply might be required only of search engines once they
have attained a certain level of market share and profitability.48 To the extent the
requirements are an added burden only on leaders in the search field, they may
leave these leaders with less resources to buy up their competitors. A consolidation
process has already been lamented in the alternative search engine world, where a
leading ranker of small search engines observes that Google is rapidly buying up
potential competitors.49 The largest search engines have an impact on indexed enti-
ties much larger than smaller, alternative ones.5" Therefore, they should be the first
type of search engine burdened with any right of reply that may be developed.
45. Grimmelmann, supra note 18, at 4.
46. E.g., David Lazarus, Fast Lane to Online Dominance, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 2007, at DI; Frederick C.
Moss, A 2006 Law Grad's Speech to the Graduating Class of 2050, 15 WIDENER L.J. 243, 245 (2006) (implying
that Google and Wal-Mart will be the dominant financial institutions in the world by 2050). But see Will
History Repeat Itself with Google Playing the Part of Lotus?, http://techdirt.com/articles/20070924/
000427.shtml (Nov. 9, 2007, 4:21 EST).
47. DEBORAH FALLOWS, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SEARCH ENGINE USERS ii (2005), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP-Searchengine-users.pdf (stating that 62 percent of internet searchers are
unaware of the difference between paid and unpaid results); Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008).
48. See generally Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust and the Systemic Bias against Small Business: Kodak, Strategic
Conduct, and Leverage Theory, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 231, 233 (2001) ("Modern markets and antitrust policy
combine to create a systemic bias against small business. The bias is created by the convergence of three factors:
(1) the presence of large power firms in most markets; (2) the exercise of countervailing power in commercial
transactions between power firms; and (3) the power firms' strategic exercise of power against non-power
players, raising their costs or forcing them to accept unfavorable, discriminatory terms.").
49. The Dream Team of Search Part Ill, htp://altsearchengines.com/2007/09/07/the-dream-team-of-
search-part-iii (Sept. 7, 2007, 10:33 EST). The author claims:
[Alternative search engines must] [c]ollaborate or [plerish. If the [alternative search engines] don't
begin their collaboration now, the Google cycle will just continue unchecked.
[The Google cycle:
1. Look at the Top 100 Alternative Search Engines. Pick your favorite one.
2. Imitate their approach, hire their talent, or just buy them outright.
3. (1 need to) Replace the now-missing Alt with a lesser quality one.
4. Repeat steps 1-3.
Note that as step 3 recurs, the alternative search engine rankings system becomes less valuable, leading less
consumers to seek alternatives to dominant search engines.
50. See Katie Hafner, We're Google. So Sue Us., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, at CI (discussing the devastating
effect a massive search engine like Google can have on a company); Press Release, Nielsen Online, Nielsen
Online Announces September U.S. Search Share Rankings (Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://www.netratings.
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Even when limited to dominant search engines, the exact contours of a right of
reply require a good deal of clarification and specification. Grimmelmann raises
two challenges to the "personal name" right:
Pasquale's annotation proposal creates an opportunity for abuse-in this case,
to muscle one's way onto search results pages. Would George W. Bush be able
to asterisk every progressive blog? The search equivalent to the commercial
spain industry is a place of mind-boggling tenacity and creativity. There are
people who would consider changing their name to "Cheap Mortgage" or "Dis-
count Viagra" if it would get them on the first page of search results for a
popular enough phrase."'
As for the Bush challenge, perhaps another limitation on the name right would
track the "public/private" figure distinction in defamation law, reserving protection
for the latter.s2 The name change issue could lead the United States to follow the
example of other nations that have regulated naming. s3 For example, "In Germany,
the government still bans invented names and names that don't clearly designate a
child's sex. Sweden and Denmark forbid names that officials think might subject a
child to ridicule. Swedish authorities have rejected such names as Veranda, Ikea and
Metallica.""4 Such rules may well be adopted in an attenuated form in the United
States to prevent the opportunism that Grimmelmann fears.
III. SEARCH AND SPEECH: FROM CONSUMER PROTECTION TO
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
Admittedly, the greatest threat to regulation of search comes not from the consid-
ered policy arguments of scholars like Grimmelmann, but from the First Amend-
ment concerns his essay's title adumbrates. 5 Is a regulatory effort to shape search
results a form of censorship-or at least the type of "forced speech" that the U.S.
Supreme Court has recently rejected in cases like Hurley v. Irish-American GLB of
com/pr/pr_071019.pdf (chart showing that over 70 percent of total online searches are done on one of the two
major search engines (Google or Yahoo)).
51. Grimmelmann, supra note 15, at 51.
52. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (adopting a rule that "prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not"); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (further
defining "public figure").
53. See generally Thomas Fuller, In Thai Cultural Battle, Name-Calling is Encouraged, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
2007, at A4 (examining the trend in Thailand for children to be given nicknames such as "Mafia" or "Seven"
and the Ministry of Culture's published booklet of proposed nicknames); Ugandans Grab 'Pig-for-Name' Deal,
ALIAZEERA.NET, Dec. 11, 2006, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2B251ClO-2561-4D5F-97BF-99F3EEB
7D732.htm (discussing Ugandan government officials outrage at a Danish artist's offering of a pig to anyone
who took on his last name).
54. Alexandra Alter, The Baby-Name Business, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2007, at Wl.
55. See generally Grimmelmann, supra note 15.
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Boston 6 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale?7 Perhaps, but the Court has also "cor-
rected course" in its 9-0 decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institu-
tional Rights, Inc.,"5 which allows the government to condition certain benefits on
government beneficiaries' compliance with governmental standards.5 9 Jennifer
Chandler describes how the FAIR precedent could cabin any search engine's claims
that the First Amendment prohibits government regulation of its results:
A prohibition against blocking access to websites or refusing to include them
in a search engine index would prima facie be an interference with the selec-
tion intermediary's selection freedom. However, . . . [FAIR] suggest[s] that
such a rule would not raise the concerns typically associated with compelled
speech. This is because such a rule is content neutral, it would not curtail the
selection intermediary's ability to speak, the selection intermediary would not
be understood to endorse the website (or it could post disclaimers) and the
selection intermediary would not be forced to modify its own speech to respond
or to avoid triggering the rule.6"
Perhaps the bevy of immunities Congress has granted to search engines via the
Digital Millenium Copyright Act6' and Communications Decency Act62 should be
conditioned on something like the asterisk proposal6 -or at least their adoption of
some self-regulating internal processes designed to give those hurt by search results
a fair hearing.64
56. 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995) (holding that requiring "private citizens who organize a parade to include
among marchers a group imparting a message that the organizers do not wish to convey" is a violation of First
Amendment free speech rights).
57. 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (reversing a New Jersey Supreme Court ruling that required the Boy Scouts to
admit a gay assistant scoutmaster because it violated the Boy Scouts' right of expressive association).
58. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
59. Id. at 69-70.
60. Chandler, supra note 9, at 1129.
61. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 34, at 335.
62. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). See
generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 34.
63. This proposal would apply what Orin Kerr proposes for indexed sites to the search engines that bring
them to attention:
Orin Kerr has suggested pressuring Web sites to make harassment less searchable. His proposal would
revoke a Web site's section 230 immunity with respect to anything it allows search engines to index.
(There are several common protocols used by Web sites to request that search engines not index
particular pages. The legal effect of these protocols is unclear, but the major search engines all respect
these opt-out requests.) A site operator would have to choose between taking full responsibility for
content on her site or keeping it out of search engines.
Grimmelmannn, supra note 15, at 49; see also Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.
com/posts/1176705254.shtml (Apr. 16, 2007, 17:11 EST).
64. See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (noting that students who have suffered a loss or
interference with a protected property interest "must be given some kind of notice and some kind of hearing");
Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
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In Federal Search Commission?, Oren Bracha and I respond to early court cases
holding that search results cannot be the subject of litigation because such account-
ability would chill speech.6" Like Grimmelmann, some other commentators have
suggested that regulation may amount to censorship." In its most extreme form,
the argument is that search engines provide information just like a newspaper does,
and deserve roughly the same amount of First Amendment solicitude.67 More qual-
ified critiques push the idea that search engines are like broadcasters or commercial
speakers, and that regulation therefore must respect the frameworks laid out in
Turner"s and Central Hudson69 in order to pass muster.7"
Any of these conclusions about the degree of protection due to search leave some
room for regulation to structure the future of search. In the sections below, I con-
sider how broadcasters are required to clearly separate paid from editorial con-
tent.7' I next consider how the continued constitutionality of the "fairness doctrine"
for broadcasters could be applied to the search industry.72 I conclude with some
reflections on why Google should be hesitant to argue for sweeping First Amend-
ment circumvention of regulation of search." Such an approach could undermine
the constitutional foundations of the very regulatory regime it intends to use to
prevent carriers from fatally undermining its business model.74
65. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 9, at 40-52.
66. E.g., Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 68 (2004).
67. See id. at 68-69.
68. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1997) (finding that any government regulation
of broadcasters would be subject to intermediate scrutiny and that only regulation that is content-neutral and
does not substantially burden "more speech than necessary" will be held constitutional).
69. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563--64 (1980) (holding that
commercial speech is protected under the First Amendment, but to a lesser degree than other constitutional
speech, but government regulation of commercial speech (other than misleading or illegal speech) is circum-
scribed by a lesser standard of scrutiny). Andrew Sinclair applies Central Hudson to search engines in his
proposal for the dearer separation of paid and editorial content. Andrew Sinclair, Note, Regulation of Paid
Listings in Internet Search Engines: A Proposal for FTC Action, 10 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 353 (2004).
70. See, e.g., Steve Mitra, Note, The Death of Media Regulation in the Age of the Internet, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL'Y 415, 437 (2000) ("Specifically, the regulations at stake in the Red Lion and Turner I and II
decisions could be used to ensure diversification of ownership and a diversity of voices on the Internet. Under
the fairness doctrine, regulatory agencies could force Web directories and Internet search engines to list Web
sites using objective criteria, thereby ensuring that users are directed to content sites based not on commercial
relationships between sites and search engines, but on their utility to the user. A combination of the fairness
doctrine and must-carry regulations could be used to compel embedding links (since linking is dearly a form
of access on the Internet) to content sites with opposing or different points of view if controversial or political
subjects are addressed at news content sites or if public figures are attacked. One can also imagine regulations
compelling commercial sites to fund an independent news outlet, an Internet equivalent of today's Public
Broadcasting System, in the public interest. However, because the Red Lion and the Turner I and II decisions
interpreting the Constitution leave little room for the FCC or Congress to act either by promulgating content-
or access-based regulations, none of these regulatory initiatives are likely to succeed." (citation omitted)).
71. See infra Parts IIlA-B. See generally Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85
TEX. L. REV. 83 (2006) (examining the harm of undisclosed sponsorship in media).
72. See infra Part IlI.A.
73. See infra Part III.B.
74. See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 731 (2005).
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A. First Amendment Analogies
Dominant Search Engine's (DSE) may challenge annotation requirements on First
Amendment grounds. Google has been fighting a number of lawsuits challenging
its placement of websites in search results. It claims to have a First Amendment
right to exclude sites from its database and to rank web entities as it pleases.75 Yet it
is ultimately pursuing contradictory self-characterizations. For the purposes of
copyright and defamation suits, the company claims "We're not a media com-
pany-we're just a conduit. Don't come to us if we highly rank a site you find
objectionable-we're just the infrastructure. Go to the source." 6 But when called
to account for misleading rankings, it claims to be just another content provider,
and hides behind the shield of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (which de-
clared a statutory "right of reply" mandate in newspapers unconstitutional)."
For example, in Langdon v. Google,7" the complainant claimed that Google had a
duty to carry his advertisements, which charged U.S. bureaucrats with corruption
and China with committing atrocities. 79 The district court dismissed the claim"0
along the lines that cyberlaw scholar Eric Goldman predicted it would: Google's
advertising decisions were tantamount to those made by a newspaper, and there-
fore regulation of them would be as suspect as the "right of reply" at issue (and
rejected) in Miami Herald v. Tornillo.s' However, the Miami Herald was merely one
of hundreds of U.S. newspapers at the time of that decision. 2 Google is far more
dominant in the world of search, 3 and its importance is only growing at the time
75. See Dahlia Lithwick, Google-Opoly: The Game No One but Google Can Play, SLATE, Jan. 29, 2003, http://
slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2077875.
76. See Richard Siklos, Struggle over Dominance and Definition, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, § 3, at 35; see
also Pasquale, supra note 10, at 120-21 (describing Google's refusal to de-list or otherwise respond to com-
plaints about search results).
77. 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (D. Del. 1974).
78. 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (2007).
79. Id. at 626. See generally Chris Langdon, Communist China Has Murdered Millions: Boycott China,
http://www.chinaisevil.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2007). Congressional concern over search engines' complicity
in the Chinese government's campaign against dissent was expressed in 2006 with the proposal of the Global
Online Freedom Act. See Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.
com/archives/2007/11 /shaming-search.html (Nov. 6, 2007, 16:57 EST).
80. Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 634-35.
81. Technology and Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/06/must-carrylaws.
htm (June 8, 2006, 12:46 EST) ("Recall that from Miami Herald v. Tornillo, a statutory must-carry rule applied
to newspapers violated the constitutional freedom of the press. Given the very specific justifications for tighter
regulation of broadcasting, and that those bases have been held inapplicable to the Internet (see, e.g., Reno v.
ACLU), I think (for these purposes) that search engines are more appropriately analogized to newspapers
instead of broadcasters. Accordingly, I can't see how any judge could constitutionally order 'must carry' relief
here.").
82. JOURNALISM.ORG, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2004: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOUR-
NALISM (2004), available at http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/narrative-newspapers-intro.aspcat=l&
media=2 (noting that in 2002 there were 1,457 U.S. daily newspapers).
83. See Posting of Greg Jarboe to Search Engine Watch, http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage.
html?page=3625072 (Feb. 22, 2007, 8:48 EST) (noting that worldwide, Google has "3 times the audience of
nearest rival, Yahoo Search"); see also Chandler, supra note 9, at 1116 (citing The un-Google, ECONOMIST, June
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of this writing. 4 Given the weakness of Langdon's case generally, the Langdon court
may well have been using a constitutional sledgehammer to knock out a vexatious
fly.85 Cases like Langdon do not merely end frivolous business tort claims, but also
set dangerous precedents that could serve as roadblocks to substantive regulation of
search.
Search engines' self-characterization-as merely the "pipes" or "infrastructure" ar-
ranging information casts doubt on the possibility that they should be protected to
the extent that traditional content providers are protected.86 The relevant precedent
for Langdon is Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC,87 not Tornillo. In Turner,
Justice Kennedy upheld must-carry provisions for a cable network as constitu-
tional, reasoning that they further "important governmental interests" and do not
"burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests."88 In
Langdon, the real reason to dismiss the case was the lack of any such must-carry
requirement in North Carolina or federal law-not the unconstitutionality of any
hypothetical requirement.
In Turner, carrying three mandatory channels was deemed a small burden to the
cable companies, and the burden was outweighed by the furthering of government
interests in "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast televi-
sion, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplic-
ity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television
programming."" We can anticipate parallel benefits from some basic ground rules
17, 2006, at 65) ("There are four major players who produce their own independent indices, and together they
accounted for about ninety-seven percent of the United States search market share in the spring of 2006, with
Google and Yahoo! representing seventy-eight percent of the market."); Press Release, supra note 50 (showing
that Google searches make up 54 percent of all searches in September of 2007); Search Engine Relationship
Chart (Bruce Clay, Inc., Moorpark, CA), available at www.bruceclay.com/searchenginechart.pdf.
84. See Kevin J. Delaney, Google Displays Core Strength-As Product Line Expands, Search Business Drives
Surges in Profit, Revenue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2007, at A3; see also Anick Jesdanun, Study: Google Gets Bulk of
World Search, YAHOO! NEWS, Oct. 9, 2007, http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/071009/worldwidesearch.htmnl?.v=4.
85. The key point here is only that the First Amendment should not be allowed to short circuit debate on
regulation. One easily can imagine courts using Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58
(1974) (finding a law that required newspapers to print candidates' reply to editorials is impressible), to strike
down a statute that, say, makes newspapers reveal to some government body (even a private one) information
about how they decide what is news. But it would be very troubling if that sort of immunity precluded any
efforts to go "behind the curtain" at the search engine to determine if, say, manipulation of results or other
untoward behavior occurred. The newspaper and the search engine serve very different functions.
86. See Silos, supra note 76. David Eun, Google's vice president for content partnerships, stated that in
his opinion Google does not create content, but rather just channels it to users. Id.
87. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
88. Id. at 189.
89. Id. As David Wolitz argues, the same language also supports net neutrality regulations. Posting of
comment by David Wolitz to Concurring Opinions Blog, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/
08/larrys.lochner.html (Aug. 30, 2007, 01:50 EST) ("Per Turner, net neutrality would trigger only intermediate
First Amendment scrutiny-not strict scrutiny-because it would be a content-neutral regulation. That is, the
purpose of net neutrality regulation would be to foster "widespread dissemination of information from a
multiplicity of sources"-not to suppress or prefer any particular speech. Thus, net neutrality would not trigger
the highest form of scrutiny, but rather the intermediate scrutiny discussed in United States v. O'Brien.").
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of transparency (and perhaps must-carry rules) in the search engine context. Such
regulation probably will become a more pressing issue as U.S. politicians, disgrun-
tled with censorship of results in countries like China, consider requiring Google to
disclose how (and which) sites are blocked on Google.cn (when such results are
transmitted to the U.S.). 90 Even if regulators go beyond transparency obligations
and embrace must-carry rules or the "fairness doctrine" adumbrated in the asterisk
proposals discussed above, it is not clear how burdensome such a requirement
would be. Such requirements did not appear to hurt phonebooks, one recent exam-
ple of an all-purpose index that some public utility commissions forced to carry all
regional phone numbers.9'
Moreover, Google's "sponsored results" are a form of "commercial speech," and
that categorization may color legal treatment of its organic results as well.92 Clearly
Google's "sponsored results" on the right side of each page of search results is the
type of advertising that is paradigmatic of commercial speech.93 The Supreme
Court has clearly stated that "false and misleading" advertising has virtually no
protection under the First Amendment.94 That alone should be enough to permit
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to regulate those results should it decide to
enforce the suggestions it put out in the "Hippsley Letter" of 2002.9'
The Hippsley Letter (and sophisticated efforts to specify its potential enforce-
ment)96 not only suggest guidelines for search engine advertising, but also implicate
90. Clive Thompson, Google's China Problem (and China's Google Problem), N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2006, § 6,
at 10.
91. See Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 342 (1991) (citing a Kansas state regulation that
requires all operating telephone companies to issue an inclusive telephone directory every year). I am not
saying that the plaintiff in Langdon was right, or that Google had to sell him advertising space in prime
locations. All that I am arguing is that the First Amendment does not prevent some future legislature from
requiring search engines to disclose if the search engine has deliberately deleted a website from their index. If
search engines truly want to be characterized as newspapers or media companies, they might have to pay a
price by facing the same infringement liability such sites would face if they served up copyrighted or defama-
tory content.
92. See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (discussing
constitutional limitations on commercial speech); Tom Bennigson, Can Commercial Corporations Engage in
Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379 (2006) (arguing that commercial corporations' fiduciary re-
sponsibilities to shareholders render all their communication an adjunct of commercial transactions).
93. The Supreme Court defines commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests
of the speaker and its audience." Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. This definition is easily applicable to the
returned advertisements in a Google search.
94. Id. at 593.
95. Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of Adver. Practices at the FTC, to Gary Ruskin,
Executive Dir. at Commercial Alert (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.keytlaw.com/FTC/Rules/paid
placement.htm (deciding not to take regulatory action against search engines for failing to clearly mark adver-
tisements as "ads," but recommending that to avoid any further action search engines: 1) make all paid ads
clearly distinguishable from non-paid ads, 2) ensure that all paid inclusions are "clearly and conspicuously
explained and disclosed," and 3) make "no affirmative statement ... that might mislead consumers as to the
basis on which a search result is generated").
96. See generally Sinclair, supra note 69. Following on the FTC's suggestion to search engines in 2002,
Congress could a) require search engines to separate "paid" from "editorial" content, and b) establish some
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Google's organic results. The Hippsley letter focuses on the separation between
paid and editorial content"7-search engines must clearly disclose which results are
being paid for and which results arise out of a disinterested search process.9" Pres-
ently, search engines have represented that they abide by the FTC's suggestion, and
have not challenged the Hippsley Letter, but matters could change quickly if en-
forcement actions begin.99 According to one of its court filings, "Google takes ex-
traordinary measures to protect its trade secrets and confidential commercial
information."'00 Like FICO scores' and much proprietary voting machine soft-
ware," 2 the algorithm of Google's search results is a zealously guarded trade se-
cret.0 3 Enforcement of the paid content disclosure rules could lead to investigations
into these algorithms-and provoke a vigorous First Amendment defense already
suggested in a Google submission to an FTC "Town Hall."" °
No one should be surprised if Google attempts to leverage the First Amendment
immunities garnered in private law disputes in order to block or cripple regulation
of the editorial/paid content divide. Google's Senior Policy Counsel Alan Davidson
has already suggested the basic contours of the argument: "Simply put, advertising
mechanism for actually verifying the separation is occurring. Some commentators have already proposed spe-
cific suggestions for such a reform. See, e.g., id. at 368-71.
97. Letter from Heather Hippsley, supra note 95.
98. Id. Compare Goodman, supra note 71, at 96-100, 119-33 (making this basic distinction), with Eric
Goldman, Stealth Risks of Regulating Stealth Marketing: A Comment on Ellen Goodman's Stealth Marketing and
Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 11 (2006) (criticizing Goodman's distinction).
99. JORGEN J. WOUTERS, CONSUMER REPORTS WEBWATCH, STILL IN SEARCH OF DISCLOSURE: RE-EVALUAT-
ING How SEARCH ENGINES EXPLAIN THE PRESENCE OF ADVERTISING IN SEARCH RESULTS 4-5 (2005), available
at http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/pdfs/search-engine-disclosure.pdf (noting that "most search engines also
appear more interested in following the letter-rather than the spirit-of the FTC's guidelines," and that
many search engines seem to be doing as little as possible to comply with FTC recommendations and as much
as possible to camouflage the presence of advertising within their search results"). If the results of this study
remain true, enforcement actions by the FTC could lead to an immediate change in search engines' current
disclosure techniques.
100. Google's Opposition to the Government's Motion to Compel at 11, Gonzales v. Google, 234 F.R.D.
674 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2006) (Case No. 5:06-mc-80006-JW).
101. Currently, mortgage lenders are attempting to protect FICO scores from "piggybacking"-a scheme
where groups will let you borrow part of another person's credit score by becoming an authorized borrower on
the person's card. See Julie Creswell, Fake Pay Stubs Online, and Other Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2007, at AI; Credit Piggybacking--What Will They Think of Next?, MORTGAGENEWSDAILY.COM, June, 14, 2007,
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/6142007-CreditPiggybacking.asp. See generally EDWARD TENNER, WHY
THINGS BITE BACK (1997) (offering case studies of how technological breakthroughs often create bigger
problems than the one they were supposed to solve in the first place).
102. See Michael A. Carrier, Vote Counting, Technology, and Unintended Consequences, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
645 (2005) (discussing the disturbing characteristics of electronic voting); David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unac-
countability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135 (2007) (examining trade secrecy's
intrusion into voting machines, the internet, and telecommunications).
103. Stacy Collett, Cracking Google's 'Secret Sauce' Algorithm, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 14, 2007, http://
www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleld=9012943. See generally Le-
vine, supra note 102 (discussing trade secrets and arguing for greater disclosure for trade secrets involving the
public infrastructure).
104. Letter from Alan Davidson, Senior Policy Counsel, Google Inc., to the Federal Trade Commission's
Town Hall (Sept. 14, 2007), available at http:I/blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/google-town-hall-lecture.pdf.
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is information, and relevant advertising is information that is useful to consum-
ers .... It is also the case that online advertising promotes freer, more robust, and
more diverse speech."' ' Of course, the same could be said of offline advertising,
and the regime regulating false and misleading advertising there has withstood First
Amendment challenges.'0 6 However, in decisions like 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island"7 and Thompson v. Western States Mtdical Center,' the Supreme Court has
become increasingly solicitous of commercial speech. Rebecca Tushnet, author of
cutting edge articles in the field,0 9 predicts that false advertising law may be on a
collision course with the First Amendment."' A lawsuit over regulation of search
results may be an ideal vehicle for the issue to finally be settled.
Yet perhaps the First Amendment can be held in abeyance to the extent that
search engines are characterized as providing data, instead of expressing a view-
point. Google is a premier example of automated judgment, constantly engineering
new ways to order information in response to search queries."' While resisting any
efforts to "peek under the hood" of its search processes,"' Google also has been
claiming that whatever results they come up with should be protected under the
First Amendment." 3 It should be noted from the outset that Google's results are
automated. This makes Google a very different entity than a human powered
search engine such as Mahalo." When compared to something like Mahalo, or
105. Posting of Ryan Singel to Wired Blog Network, http:/Iblog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/09/google-try-
ing-t.html (Sept. 18, 2007, 5:11:55 EST); see also Letter from Alan Davidson, supra note 104.
106. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 593 (1980).
107. 517 U.S. 484, 501, 510-14 (1996) (stating that "[t]he mere fact that messages propose commercial
transactions does not in and of itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to sup-
press them" as less stringent review applies to regulations' attempt to protect consumers from misleading ads,
but that a state does not have "broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalis-
tic purposes").
108. 535 U.S. 357, 370-73, 377 (2002) (finding unconstitutional a section of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration's Modernization Act of 1997 that prohibited advertising of compound drugs that do not seek FDA
approval because the regulation of commercial speech was more extensive than necessary, but noting that "not
all regulation of [commercial speech] is unconstitutional").
109. See Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737 (2007); see
also Rebecca Tushnet, Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial Speech Doctrine, in TRADEMARK
LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds.,
forthcoming 2008), available at http://www.tushnet.com/law/truthandads.pdf [hereinafter TUSHNET, Truth in
Advertising].
110. TUSHNET, Truth and Advertising, supra note 109, at 2-3 (stating that "[tihe lines between confusing
and informative and between true and false are difficult to draw, in ways that in other contexts-particularly
libel doctrine-have led courts to impose increasing burdens on those entities, whether private or governmen-
tal, who would penalize defendants for speech that is deemed harmful because it is deemed false").
111. See George Johnson, An Oracle Part Man, Part Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 4, at 1.
112. See Google's Opposition, supra note 100, at 11 (stating that Google takes "extraordinary measures to
protect its trade secrets and confidential commercial information").
113. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 9, at 40-42.
114. See Mahalo FAQ, What is Mahalo, http://mahalo.com/Mahalo FAQ (last visited Oct. 16, 2007); see also
Randall Stross, The Human Touch that May Loosen Google's Grip, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, BU3. Mahalo,
meaning "thank you" in Hawaiian, is a new search engine that pre-prepares results, and currently has about
5,000 terms prepared on topics like health, travel, entertainment, and more. Stross, supra. Mahalo differs from
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alternative search engines or directories driven by human editors, Google is much
closer to a data provider than, say, a newspaper. The latter actually expresses a
point of view on what the news is; the former merely aggregates information.' 5
This difference has consequences for the legal treatment of search results.
Data providers like consumer reporting companies can be held more accounta-
ble for what they say than a newspaper. If I have a dispute with a newspaper over
whether they have portrayed me accurately, and they refuse to acknowledge my
complaint, I probably am going to have to sue for defamation in order to settle
things." 6 But according to an FTC website,
[i]f an investigation doesn't resolve your dispute with the consumer reporting
company, you can ask that a statement of the dispute be included in your file
and in future reports. You also can ask the consumer reporting company to
provide your statement to anyone who received a copy of your report in the
recent past.117
Moreover, "only authorized individuals such as potential lenders, employers, insur-
ance underwriters or landlords may access your report, and only if they intend to
do business with you.""' Finally, in case of disputes, "you're entitled to add a writ-
ten statement (100 words or less) explaining your view of the mistake.""' 9
Google or other search engines "[bjy using its own editors as the final arbiters of what goes in, Mahalo cuts off
access in its listings to Web sites that confuse a search engine's algorithm with advertorials that commingle
advertisements with noncommercial information," Id.
115. Google itself offers a chance to reply on certain news articles. Brad Stone, Names in the News Get a
Way to Respond, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2007, at C3; Google News, http://news.google.com/news?q-source%3A
google.news&scoring=&btpr=I (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (listing the news articles that have received a reply).
The comments page appears to tell readers (1) who is making the comment; (2) who they are affiliated with;
(3) their comment; (4) a hyperlink to their organization (usually a bio page of some sorts); and (5) a link to the
original article that is being commented on.
116. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (discussing libel claims brought by public
officials against newspapers).
117. FED. TRADE COMM'N, FACTS FOR CONSUMERS: BUILDING A BETTER CREDIT REPORT (2006), available
at http://www.ftc.govlbcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/creO3.shtm.
118. My Money Management, How to Maintain a Good Credit Rating, http://www.mymoneymanagement.
net/TIPSADVICERESOURCES/UnderstandingCredit/HowtoMaintainYourCreditScore/tabid/193/Default.aspx
(last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
119. Id. The FTC also states:
If an investigation doesn't resolve your dispute with the consumer reporting company, you can ask
that a statement of the dispute be included in your file and in future reports. You also can ask the
consumer reporting company to provide your statement to anyone who received a copy of your
report in the recent past. You can expect to pay a fee for this service.
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION FOR THE CONSUMER, CREDIT REPAIR: SELF-HELP MAY BE BEST (2005), avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/creditlrepair.pdf; see also Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 § 611,
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b) (2000) ("If the reinvestigation does not resolve the dispute, the consumer may file a brief
statement setting forth the nature of the dispute. The consumer reporting agency may limit such statements to
not more than one hundred words if it provides the consumer with assistance in writing a clear summary of
the dispute.").
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If the consumer reporting agency stands by its accusation, it must conduct a
"reasonable reinvestigation" regarding the allegedly inaccurate information. 2 °
Then, the agency provides notice of the dispute to whatever person supplied the
allegedly bad information.' The agency can cancel the reinvestigation if it reasona-
bly determines that the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant.122 Under subsection 5,
unverifiable or inaccurate information must be stricken from the report.'23
Why might we want to extend these types of protections to those who appear on
search results (and increase scrutiny of other "black box" data aggregators like rat-
ings agencies and credit bureaus)? There is something deeply troubling about unac-
countable power-about a system that can spit out some life-changing result
without giving any explanation for it.'24 Suspicion about FICO scores has led some
states to prohibit their use in insurance rating,'25 just as Finland has prevented
120. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 § 611, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) ("[Ilf the completeness or accu-
racy of any item of information contained in a consumer's file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by
the consumer and the consumer notifies the agency directly, or indirectly through a reseller, of such dispute,
the agency shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed infor-
mation is inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file
in accordance with paragraph (5), before the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the
agency receives the notice of the dispute from the consumer or reseller.").
121. Id. § 1681i(a)(2)(A) ("[Tihe agency shall provide notification of the dispute to any person who pro-
vided any item of information in dispute, at the address and in the manner established with the person. The
notice shall include all relevant information regarding the dispute that the agency has received from the con-
sumer or reseller.").
122. Id. § 1681i(a)(3)(A) ("ITihe agency shall provide notification of the dispute to any person who pro-
vided any item of information in dispute, at the address and in the manner established with the person. The
notice shall include all relevant information regarding the dispute that the agency has received from the con-
sumer or reseller.").
123. Id. § 1681i (a)(5)(A) ("If, after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1) of any information disputed by
a consumer, an item of the information is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified, the
consumer reporting agency shall- (i) promptly delete that item of information from the file of the consumer,
or modify that item of information, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation; and (ii)
promptly notify the furnisher of that information that the information has been modified or deleted from the
file of the consumer.").
124. The film Brazil provides a dark commentary on the type of dystopian bureaucratic systems that can
fundamentally change individuals' lives on the basis of random errors in computational equipment. BRAZIL
(Universal Pictures 1985). 1, along with other commentators, question whether algorithms or other artificial
intelligence should be granted constitutional rights. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelli-
gences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 (1992) (collecting objections to granting constitutional rights to artificial intelli-
gences); Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/
2007/10/king-algorithm.html (Oct. 4, 2007, 08:52 EST). Butsee IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS (2007) (lauding
data-driven analysts who take large sets of figures and come up with counterintuitive conclusions). See generally
George Johnson, An Oracle Part Man, Part Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 4, at 1 (surveying data-
driven decisionmaking technologies).
125. Liz Pulliam Weston, Demand Your FICO Score Now!, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/
YourCreditRating/DemandYourFICOScoreNow.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2007) (noting that a few states, like
California and Massachusetts, prohibit FICO scores from being used in insurance ratings). Many other states
have proposed such legislation. Press Release, MASSPIRG, Proposed Auto Rules Need Stronger Consumer
Protections (Aug. 29, 2003) ("Credit scores and information gathered from consumers' credit reports have only
been temporarily prohibited for rating purposes and have not been restricted at all for use in denying coverage
altogether. Earlier this month 10 consumer groups urged the Commissioner and the Governor to ban the use
of all socioeconomic rating and underwriting factors such as credit scores, which have nothing to do with an
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employers from using Google results in evaluating potential applicants. 126 Full First
Amendment protection should be reserved for accountable, attributable speech-
not the opaque data processing systems that are increasingly powerful arbiters of
taste, authority, and creditworthiness.
Of course, given the legal landscape here, Google may well see the First Amend-
ment as a legal sword perfect for cutting a Gordian knot of regulatory challenges.
Even if it fails to achieve the status of a newspaper or media outlet, protection
under Turner still will lead to some scrutiny of government action.'27 The growing
First Amendment backlash against false advertising regulation (coupled with trade
secrecy protections against vigorous enforcement) could cripple even the FTC's
authority to force a distinction between paid and unpaid content. Yet search en-
gines may want to be careful what they wish for in First Amendment
developments.
B. The First Amendment: A Double-Edged Sword
As Google grows, regulators are starting to take notice. 2 s Many have written about
the privacy-eroding implications of massive database coordination, but the legal
discussion is only beginning about the results of Google searches.'29 Consider the
fate of countless businesses which depend on internet-based customers for their
livelihood. 3 John Battelle chronicled one small business's Google crisis:
[R]ight before the critical holiday shopping season ....
the phones stopped ringing [at large-shoe seller, 2bigfeet.com] ....
individual's ability to drive and which correlate with a consumer's income level and race."), available at http://
www.masspirg.org/news-releases/auto-insurance/auto-insurance-news/proposed-auto- rules-need-stronger-
consumer-protections; Press Release, ConsumersUnion.org, Consumers Union Urges Lawmakers to Ban Use of
Credit Histories in Setting Homeowners Insurance Rates (June 20, 2003) (discussing a California bill that
would "prohibit[s] insurers from using a consumer's credit history to rate, underwrite, cancel or refuse to
renew a homeowners policy .... land) also prohibits insurers from requiring a particular payment plan for
homeowners insurance based on an individual's credit history"), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/
pub/2003/06/000196print.html.
126. Act on the Protection of Privacy in Working Life, 759/2004 (2004) (Fin.).
127. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (holding that intermediate scrutiny is the
standard used in evaluating constitutionality of cable television regulation under the First Amendment).
128. Comparisons are being made between Google and Microsoft, which has faced antitrust probes both in
the United States and Europe. In the United States, regulators are currently probing Google's proposed
purchase of the internet advertising company, DoubleClick, and Europe is expected to follow suit. Elise Acker-
man, Google Grows Into a Target, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2007, at Fl (noting growing concerns over
privacy and Google's secretive software); Thomas Crampton, Google Said to Violate Copyright Laws, N.Y.
TiMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at C3 (noting new legal troubles for Google in Europe); Web-ocrats Down Under, WALL
ST. J., July 19, 2007, at A14 (noting legal problems for Google in Australia).
129. For example, a Google search on "Search Engine Regulation" brings up 1,800 results, "Regulation of
Search Engine Results" brings up only 3, and "Regulation of Google Search Results" has 0 returns. (Oct. 24,
2007).
130. See, e.g., John Markoff, Google Aims for the Classified Ads Business, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at C6.
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[It] was no longer the first result for "big feet" on Google. In fact, it wasn't even
in the first hundred results. As [business owner Neil] Moncrief put it, it was as
if the Georgia Department of Transportation had taken all the road signs away
in the dead of night, and his customers could no longer figure out how to drive
to his store...
Google had tweaked its search result algorithms, something the company does
quite frequently. But this time Google's modifications, which were intended to
foil search engine spammers [people who dishonestly modify their web sites to
rank higher in search engine results], had somehow sideswiped Moncriefs site
as well. What Google giveth, Moncrief learned the hard way, Google can also
take away. 3'
When a company can exercise make-or-break power over internet-based busi-
nesses, does it need to be held accountable to some standards? Google says that it
does not-that it has a First Amendment right to rank web entities as it pleases." 2
But consider what Google itself thinks of the companies that own the "pipes" that
transmit its services. In its advocacy for net neutrality, it repeatedly has argued that
these digital conduits do not deserve the right to "fast-track" certain content, or to
charge certain websites more than others." Google is eager to characterize the
internet's "pipes" as infrastructural, but not its own service-even if it has higher
market share than the broadband providers it has asked the FCC to regulate. 4
Google has advocated for FCC policy that would put several restrictions on car-
riers like telephone and cable companies. 3 ' For those who control the all-impor-
tant "last mile" of cable into households and businesses, they propose a ban on the
following:
" Levying surcharges on content providers that are not their retail customers;
" Prioritizing data packet delivery based on the ownership or affiliation (the
who) of the content, or the source or destination (the what) of the content; or
" Building a new "fast lane" online that consigns Internet content and applica-
tions to a relatively slow, bandwidth-starved portion of the broadband
connection. '36
131. JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: How GOOGLE AND ITs RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND
TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 156 (2005).
132. See Lithwick, supra note 75.
133. See Miriam Hill, With Billions at Stake, Corporate Giants Square Off on Law to Ensure "Net Neutrality,"
PHILA. INQUIRER, June 19, 2006, at A01.
134. See Steve Hewlett, Media: Media FAQ, GUARDIAN, July 3, 2006, at 3.
135. See, e.g., Martin H. Bosworth, Google Challenges Verizon over Lobbying of FCC, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.
COM, Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/newsO4/2007/10/google_verizon.html (noting Google's
persistence in calling for the FCC to support their open access requirements).
136. Posting of Richard Whitt, Washington Telecom and Media Counsel at Google, Inc., to Google Public
Policy Blog, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2007/06/what-do-we-mean-by- net- neutraity.htmi (June
16, 2007, 17:52 EST).
VOL. 3 NO. 1 2008
DEBATING A RIGHT OF REPLY ON SEARCH RESULTS
Why are these goals so important for Google (and the other search engine applica-
tion providers that have joined the Open Internet Coalition)? Robert X. Cringely
succinctly presents the following nightmare scenario for the company:
What if Verizon, and AT&T, and Comcast, and half a dozen other huge broad-
band ISPs suddenly cut deals with some search company other than Google
and your ISP-supplied browser and homepage no longer give such prominence
to Google? The G-folk have rabid competitors who would very much like to
take over that top spot. Would we even notice? How different are the search
results these days from one engine to another? Not very different.'37
The situation he describes is threatening enough for Google to spur it to lobby for
"net neutrality" rules designed (in part) to prevent upstream providers of "con-
duits" from squeezing application providers like search engines for more money-
or shutting them down altogether.'38
Despite this threat, Google appears to be embracing expansive interpretations of
the First Amendment now in ways that will undermine fights for net neutrality in
the future. " Just as Google claims that it has a First Amendment right to order
web pages as it pleases, broadband carriers may claim that they have a First
Amendment right to avoid government regulation.'40 Is their "message" that much
different than Google's?
Several scholars have laid theoretical foundations for a First Amendment chal-
lenge to net neutrality regulations. Christopher S. Yoo has complained of "architec-
tural censorship" of carriers by the FCC,' and Larry Tribe has argued that
regulation of telecommunications should be susceptible to much greater First
Amendment scrutiny.'42 According to one report, Tribe has weighed in to cut off
137. Robert X. Cringely, Is Google on Crack?: Eric Schmidt Bets the Ranch on Wireless Spectrum, 1, CRINGELY,
July 27, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/2007/pulpit_20070727-002573.html. But see Jon Brodkin,
Search Engine Roulette, NETWORKWORLD, June 15, 2007, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/061507-
search-engine-results.html?page=l ("In a study of 19,332 queries, Google, Yahoo, Windows Live and Ask deliv-
ered the same top result only 3.6% of the time. The four engines never delivered the same top three results,
even when the order of the results was ignored. Fewer than 1% of first-page results were shared by all four
sites."). Given search's status as a credence good, it is by no means clear that diversity of results is actually
understood by consumers or leads to durable allegiance to one search engine.
138. See Posting of Richard Whitt, supra note 136; see also Tom Abate, Speed Bumps on the Information
Highway, S.F. CHRON., June 18, 2006, at Al.
139. See Lithwick, supra note 75 (describing Google's argument that the First Amendment protects Google's
right to order and rank their results as they please, and even have no duty to list a specific rcsult on their search
engine).
140. See Michael Posner, Media Giants a Big Step in Wrong Direction, GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada), Mar. 20,
2002, at B15.
141. See generally Yoo, supra note 74 (contending that structural regulations can have adverse impacts on
speech and First Amendment rights, amounting to architectural censorship by the FCC).
142. See Laurence H. Tribe, Why the Federal Communications Commission Should Not Adopt a Broad View of
the "Primary Video" Carriage Obligation: A Reply to the Broadcast Organizations 3-5, 7-18 (Nov. 24, 2003)
(unpublished regulatory filing with the FCC, available at http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=215).
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the debate on net neutrality, suggesting that virtually any regulation of the big
carriers' treatment of content would violate the First Amendment:
Professor Tribe was asked ... whether he thought broadband providers should
be allowed to censor music lyrics critical of the President of the United States.
Tribe rephrased the question: Can [broadband providers] be forced to act as
common carriers? [and. . . J cited Hurley . . . 515 U.S. 557 (1995) - as the
decision that "would probably apply here." In that case, the organizers of a
parade did not want to include among the marchers a group espousing a view
with which the organizers did not agree. The Supreme Court ruled that the
parade was not merely a conduit for the speech of participants.'43
As Neil Richards has noted,'44 (and as Oren Bracha and I argue in our piece on
search engine regulation'4 ), the First Amendment is the 800-pound gorilla in the
room of equitable information policy. Many First Amendment absolutists would
like to see it eviscerate the public's rights to privacy and cultural self-determina-
tion.'46 Here is the philosophical foundation of Tribe's position, excerpted from his
article "The Constitution in Cyberspace":
143. Posting of Hance Haney to The Technology Liberation Front, http://www.techliberation.com/archives/
042715.php (Aug. 24, 2007, 14:03 EST). In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Groups of Boston,
515 U.S. 557 (1995), the Court tried to distinguish the parade organizers whose free speech was at issue from
the cable operators who lost their First Amendment challenge to must-carry rules in Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576. While cable operators had a "monopolistic
opportunity to shut out some speakers," the gay and lesbian marchers in Hurley could organize their own
parade. Id. at 577. Tribe appears to believe that the decline of spectrum scarcity makes it just as easy for those
dissatisfied with their internet service to find another provider, just like the gay and lesbian marchers could
find or organize another parade. Id.; see Laurence H. Tribe, Address before the Progress and Freedom Foundation:
Freedom of Speech and Press in the 21st Century: New Technology Meets Old Constitutionalism (Aug. 21, 2007), in
PROGRESS ON POINT 14.19, Sept. 2007, at 5. But given that 99.6 percent of households have two or less choices
for service, that appears to be quite an optimistic assumption (even if it appears to be shared by some parts of
the DOJ). See, e.g., Reconsidering our Comnunications Laws, Before S. Comm. on Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2
(2006) (Prepared Statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.),
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1937&witid=5416. Moreover, the possibility that
Comcast has a "message" that "must-carry" rules interfere with is much less convincing than the argument of
the Irish-Catholic organizers of the St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston had a message (of exclusion) that gay
and lesbian marchers would undermine. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559.
144. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1150-51
(2005) (noting, but opposing, a "widely held belief that because the First Amendment protects at its core the
dissemination of truthful information, any right of 'data privacy' is in direct conflict with the First Amendment
because any attempt to regulate ... would inevitably require . . . unconstitutional restrictions on speech").
145. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 9, at 40-52. Oren Bracha and I, similar to Neil Richards, note that
"[c]ourts seem eager to treat search results as constitutionally protected speech and summarily find any attempt
to regulate... results ... [in either] censorship of an opinion or compelled speech." Id. at 41. This proposition
and eagerness of courts, however, we argue, is on "somewhat shaky ground." Id. at 41-52.
146. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 143; see also Lithwick, supra note 75 (describing Google's First Amendment
legal argument).
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[Given that] networks . . .acquire quasi-governmental powers as they ...
mediat[e] their members' conflicting interests ... [a] tempting conclusion is
that... judges must treat these networks not as associations that have rights of
their own against the government but as virtual "governments" in them-
selves-as entities against which individual rights must be defended in the
Constitution's name....
... [B]ut . . . [iut's a fallacy to suppose that, just because a computer
bulletin board or network or gateway is something like a shopping mall, gov-
ernment has as much constitutional duty--or even authority-to guarantee
open public access to such a network .... [N]othing about any new technology
suddenly erases the Constitution's enduring value of restraining government
above all else, and of protecting all private groups, large and small, from
government. 147
Tribe never mentions the extraordinary amount of money that carriers shower on
Congress, 4 ' or the way in which the FCC's present way of doing business tends to
marginalize non-carrier stakeholders.' Yet in a recent speech in Aspen, 5 ' Tribe
continued to stress how much major carriers need protection from the state they
do so much to influence.' 5'
Of course, where Tribe sees a telecosm' 52 of media diversity, many experts on
telecommunications law only see duopoly.I' There are several reasons to oppose
Tribe's position, and even Yoo has conceded that his similar (but better developed
and targeted) approach would likely be unpersuasive to courts." 4 The evolution of
147. Laurence H. Tribe, Prepared Keynote Remarks at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom &
Privacy: The Constitution in Cyberspace (Mar. 1991), available at http://www.sjgames.com/SS/tribe.html (em-
phasis added).
148. See OPENSECRETS.ORG, TELECOM SERVICES & EQUIPMENT: MONEY TO CONGRESS (2006 election cycle),
http://opensecrets.org/industries/summary.asp?lnd=B09&cycle=2006 (stating that in the 2006 election cycle
alone, the telecom service and equipment industry gave congress members a total of $4,667,413 in campaign
donations).
149. See generally John Dunbar, FCC's Methods Leaves Public in the Dark, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Sept. 9,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/04/AR2007090401103.html (noting
that the FCC often does not conduct its business in an open fashion).
150. Posting of Adam Thierer to The Progress & Freedom Foundation Blog, http://blog.pff.orglarchives/
2007/08/laurence.tribe.html (Aug. 23, 2007, 00:13 EST) ("Prof. Tribe began by noting that the Supreme Court
had perpetrated a 'profound fallacy' in the Red Lion and Pacifica cases in holding that spectrum scarcity or a
medium's 'pervasiveness' in society could be used as a rationale for censorship of broadcasters or any other
media operator. And he argued that although 'today's FCC continues to sing the Pacifica tune,' if the Supreme
Court reconsidered Red Lion or Pacifica today, 'the odds are overwhelming that the Court [would overturn
them]' because the Court would recognize that those rationales were probably never valid but are certainly not
valid in an age of media abundance and cross-platform convergence.").
151. See Tribe, supra note 143.
152. See generally GEORGE F. GILDER, TELECOSM: How INFINITE BANDWITH WILL REVOLUTIONIZE OUR
WORLD (2000).
153. See Michael Bazeley, Telecom Choices for Consumers: Probably Just Two, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb.
2, 2005, at 1A.
154. Yoo, supra note 74, at 727-31.
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Tribe's position since the early 1980's is quite striking; consider this quote from
Speech as Power:
[M]ore and more of the most important forums and means of communication
are coming under the control of fewer and fewer private owners.
These changes in access to and control over the forms of public communica-
tion have eaten away at the average citizen's rights of expression and, thus,
.... it is not exaggerating to say that that order could be seriously threatened
by a continued failure of the Court to take account of background institutions
of power and the costs of participation in public dialogue.5 '
This diagnosis is all the more appropriate today, as media consolidation acceler-
ates.156 As Neil Richards,'57 Lee Greenwood' and Julie Cohen"s9 have suggested,
positions like Tribe's and Yoo's would do for information policy what Lochner did
for economic regulation. 160
I will not go into great detail here to dispute Tribe's First Amendment absolu-
tism; 161 suffice it to say that Federal Search Commission's arguments regarding the
155. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 198 (1985) (emphasis added).
156. See Eric Klinenberg, The National Entertainment State (Forum), NATION, July 3, 2006, at 22 (noting
that since 1996, an "unprecedented" number of media mergers have occurred, making it increasingly hard to
determine which conglomerate owns what).
157. See Richards, supra note 144, at 1153-54 ("The First Amendment critics' assumption [of privacy law]
not only ignores the reality that few data privacy rules actually involve speech, but also significantly overstates
the breadth of the protection afforded by the ... First Amendment .... I suggest that much of this "speech" is
either outside the scope of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, or constitutes a hitherto
unnoticed category of speech warranting rational basis review .... From the privacy law perspective ... the
parallels are striking between the strong form of the First Amendment critique and the discredited 'liberty of
contract' doctrine of the Lochner period.... [This] critique paves the way for the obliteration of the distinction
between economic and civil rights at the core of post-Lochner American constitutionalism... [and] threaten[s]
to unravel the basic premise upon which post-New Deal constitutionalism is based.").
158. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659, 666. ("The First
Amendment, in the name of preserving the underpinnings of political self-government, is replacing politics
with law. Lochner, then, has returned. Once again, our Court is trying to solve the problems of our joint
economic life by interpreting the principles of liberal abstention. But the rules of living together are too com-
plicated for that .... ).
159. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97
MICH. L. REV. 462, 464 (1998).
160. This would be a sad result indeed for Tribe, a thinker who so compellingly recognized "speech as
power" in his book Constitutional Choices. Tribe, supra note 155, at 188.
161. David Wolitz elucidates the doctrinal shortcomings of Tribe's position:
[Nlet neutrality would trigger only intermediate First Amendment scrutiny-not strict scrutiny-
because it would be a content-neutral regulation....
Net neutrality can easily pass intermediate scrutiny because (1) it promotes the important gov-
ernmental interest in ensuring "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" competition in the Internet
content and applications markets and (2) its only burden on speech-potentially diminishing the
editorial discretion of broadband providers-is precisely the means essential to securing the interest
invoked.
In sum, under current precedent, net neutrality would be entirely consistent with the First
Amendment, even if we grant that it does "force" some speech on broadband providers.
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limits of search engines' free speech rights are likely to apply a fortiori to the pre-
sent dominant carriers.'62 However, the potential expansion of First Amendment
protections should worry a company like Google. By characterizing all it does as
speech, it may well pave the road for carriers to do the same. If they do so, the net
neutrality legislation Google so vigorously supports may itself be deemed
unconstitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a recent interview, Siva Vaidhanathan nicely encapsulated some of the most
pressing concerns raised by search engines:
[A]s Google grows in importance in our lives, we should demand some ac-
countability.... [Clompetition is failing to generate that accountability...
Google has managed to leverage its advantage in Web search to become a
player, an instant factor, in so many different parts of our lives and so many
parts of the economy. . . . [Ilt's about time we began to question Google's
motives and tactics. 63
The questioning can begin in earnest once we recognize how quickly old services
are converging."' WalMart worries that Google will be a fierce competitor.'65 A
service like Yahoo! Yellow Pages is rapidly replacing phone books' 66-anyone who
needs to find a particular business can just type in a zip code and a name and
usually get some results. Google News, once merely an aggregator, is itself becom-
ing more and more like a digital newspaper, even offering a "right of reply" feature
on some stories.'67 Google's subsidiary, YouTube, hosts thousands of "channels,"
each maintained by amateur "broadcasters" whose offerings range from pirated
content to original programming. 66 None of these web services fit easily into old
media categories of newspaper, magazine, broadcaster, "data service," or carrier.
Posting of David Wolitz to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/08/
larrys-lochner.html (Aug. 30, 2007, 1:50 EST).
162. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 9, at 40-57.
163. Brian McNeill, UVA Professor Takes on 'Googlization,' DAILY PROGRESS, Sept. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.dailyprogress.com/servlet/Satelite?pagename=CDP%2FMGArticle%2FCDP-BasicArticle&c=MG
Artide&cid=l 173352941956&path=!news; see also Posting of Danny Sullivan to Search Engine Land, http://
searchengineland.com/071106-102435.php (Nov. 6, 2007, 10:24 EST).
164. See, e.g., EPIC 2014, supra note 7.
165. Lohr, supra note 1.
166. See, e.g., Meg Richards, Net Search Sector Still Risky, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 22, 2004, at 6C.
167. See Stone, supra note 115.
168. See generally YouTube, About YouTube, http://youtube.com/t/about (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
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When one influential company can combine so many functions,'69 old First
Amendment analogies quickly fall apart.' If the debate on a "right of reply" on
search engines demonstrates one thing, it is the need to think beyond the old cate-
gories and to develop a new way of balancing dominant search engines' rights and
responsibilities. I have argued that search engines' rights to use the intellectual
property of others should be expanded given the services they provide.'7' However,
their own IP rights or First Amendment protections may have to yield to compel-
ling societal interests in more accountable and accurate search engine results."2
Transcending the old First Amendment categories is going to be a difficult intel-
lectual exercise; as polymath Doug Hofstadter recently argued, analogy may be at
the core of all cognition."' Lawyers who argue on the basis of precedent are con-
stantly trying to show how a particular situation is like (or unlike) a situation au-
thoritatively addressed by law in the past (pace Schauer).' But in the search space,
categories like "newspaper," "information service," "broadcaster," and "data pro-
vider" are just not broad enough to cover the range of social functions of search.
The "structure of search law" may have to be something quite different from past
regulatory schemes.7 5 The practical shortcomings of a "fairness doctrine" in broad-
casting (or its constitutional infirmity in the case of newspapers) should be no
reason to dismiss certain limited rights of reply to search results.
169. Lohr, supra note I (explaining that that Google is usurping the function of many businesses by offer-
ing superior services); Stone, supra note 115 (reporting that Google News is beginning to take over the function
of print media by offering a right of reply feature on some stories).
170. See Who's Afraid of Google, supra note 3 (analogizing the need for regulating search engines to the
regulation of the banking industry); see also KIRN, supra note 4; Matt Weiland, Web of Spies, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
11, 2007, § 7, at 14 (book review). See generally Douglas R. Hofstadter, Analogy as the Core of Cognition, in THE
ANALOGICAL MIND 499-538 (Dedre Gentner et al. eds., 2001), available at http://prelectur.stanford.edu/lectur-
ers/hofstadter/analogy.html; Frederick Schauer, Why Precedent in Law (and Elsewhere) is Not Totally (or Even
Substantially) about Analogy (KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP07-036, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1007001.
171. See Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privileging of Categorizers,
60 VAND. L. REV. 135 (2007).
172. See supra Parts II, Il1.
173. See Hofstadter, supra note 170, at 499.
174. See generally Schauer, supra note 170.
175. Grimmelmann, supra note 18. Grimmelmann advises legal scholars and regulators that a multiplicity
of legal doctrines balance the rights of technology developers, users, and third parties. Id. at 50-51. Any search
engine laws will need to satisfy as "many competing policy demands at once as possible." Id.
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